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1. The global financial crisis and global financial regulation: big expectations but small change 
 
‘One of the things most astonishing to posterity about our own times will be not 
how much we understood but how much we took for granted. We revel in every 
new excuse to label our times revolutionary; ours is the  
atomic/permissive/electronic/affluent/space age. Attention centers on the glittering 
pageant and dramatic incident, rather than on the elusive processes that evoke the 
incidents. Revolutions must be visible, palpable, and immediate, although it is the 
annual change of only one percent that can produce some of the greatest 
transformations. Paradoxically, a glib preoccupation with the ‘revolutionary’ has 
tended to reduce our sensitivity to change itself’ (Heclo 1974: 1). 
Since the onset of the global financial crisis, ‘change’ has been the catchword in the international 
regulatory debate. In an attempt to respond to the weaknesses in financial regulation and 
supervision exposed by the crisis,1 important legislative changes have been adopted in the world’s 
leading financial centers, notably the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States and European Union 
legislation mandating the creation of new pan-European regulatory and supervisory authorities. At 
the international level, the leaders of the Group of 20 (G20) endorsed major reform proposals, partly 
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 The literature on the causes of the global financial crisis is already quite large and it is not the purpose of this 
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in conjunction with the revamped Financial Stability Board (FSB) in areas such as banking regulation, 
compensation practices, resolution regimes, the development of macroprudential frameworks and 
tools, and the workings of derivatives markets and their infrastructure.2 Interestingly, the regulatory 
reform process has often been presented in terms of a revolutionary transformation. At the height 
of the crisis, several political leaders suggested comparisons between the current reformist moment 
and the Bretton Woods moment (Parker and Barber 2008; Porter, Winnett and Harnden 2009), 
when the creation of new rules and institutions ‘revolutionized’ international monetary cooperation. 
Much early emphasis from policy-makers and indeed scholars3 focused on the potential for 
significant transformation in global financial regulation. Referring to Peter Hall’s (1993) seminal 
study on the paradigmatic shift in UK economic policymaking, Mark Blyth (forthcoming) laments the 
absence of third-order change. Nevertheless, as the quotation from Heclo at the start of this section 
reminds us,4 the disproportionate attention towards revolutionary change risks reducing our 
understanding of change itself.   
This is important as the process of international financial regulatory reform as it has evolved, 
displays few of the revolutionary characteristics that had been touted. For instance, although 
progress has been made on microprudential banking regulation with the introduction of higher and 
counter-cyclical buffers into the Basel III accord of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(Basel Committee), Basel III has not altered the practice of allowing banks to measure their own risk 
when setting capital requirements (Haldane 2012) and there is still no agreement on what should 
exactly count as liquid assets to satisfy the proposed liquidity standards. Furthermore, a stinging 
issue throughout the crisis, that of ‘too-big-to-fail’ financial institutions, remains under-explored and 
instruments aimed at increasing the loss absorbency capacity of systematically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs) have yet to be incorporated into formal and binding rules. As for the development 
of macroprudential regulation, which aims to preserve the health and stability of the financial 
system as a whole, agreement on what policy tools fall into its scope is still in its infancy (Baker in 
this volume). In addition, the creation of an effective cross-border resolution scheme is still on the 
nominal ‘to do’ list, as is the regulation of the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market and the 
shadow banking system (Carstensen and Rixen in this volume). Finally, and despite the criticisms it 
has attracted, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has displayed remarkable 
stability in the content of rules, governance structure, and decision-making (Botzem in this volume). 
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 At the time of writing, the latest report assessing the implementation of G20 recommendations for the 
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Overview of Progress in the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability, 
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 The quotation is linked to Heclo’s study on the evolution of social policy in Britain and Sweden (1974).  
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In short, the process of international financial reform has fallen short of initial (and proclaimed) 
expectations of rapid and revolutionary transformation and has instead been characterised by small 
and incremental changes.  
The incremental pattern of change in global financial regulation may also be considered puzzling in 
theoretical terms – primarily because the conditions for the kind of punctuations that are associated 
with very large and often very consequential policy shifts appeared to be in place.5 Indeed, it is often 
recognised that an exogenous shock, such as the one offered by the global financial crisis, is likely to 
trigger a reaction that overcomes the institutional frictions that usually constrain policy change. 
Periods of ‘normal’ marginal adaptation are interrupted by more infrequent and atypical periods of 
‘non-linear’ policy changes (Howlett and Migone 2011, 54). Such changes are more likely to occur 
when the exogenous shock interacts with heightened public and government attention and with the 
alteration of the policy subsystem that is involved in the decision-making (Baumgartner and Jones 
1993, True et al. ). These are precisely the conditions that characterised the post-crisis environment. 
Indeed, the crisis catalysed public and policy-makers’ attention around financial regulatory issues 
(see also Helleiner, Pagliari and Zimmermann 2009). At the same time, the debate on the content of 
financial rules became increasingly politicised, as attested by the primary role accorded to the G20 
political leaders in international financial negotiations – although experts retained a primary role in 
diagnosing the crisis and suggesting reform proposals. As such, the conditions for a punctuated-type 
of change were in principle in place; instead, incremental changes prevailed.  
Why was the reform process incremental although the conditions for more rapid and abrupt 
transformations appeared to exist? And is there anything specific about financial policy that 
prevents punctuations from occurring, making this policy field different from those where the 
existence of punctuations is now well-established? 6 
This book answers these questions, investigating the empirical pattern of incremental change in the 
post-crisis financial regulatory debate. Based on examination of a variety of policy fields within the 
area of finance broadly defined, the findings of this collaborative project suggest that the specific 
institutional frictions that characterise global financial governance and the activity of change agents 
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 According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993) incremental policy making, while common and dominant most of 
the time, is only one of two models of policy making: periods of incremental adjustments are routinely 
punctuated by short-lived bouts of radical policy change. 
6
 The best studied example of the combination of incrementalism and occasional punctuations is governmental 
budgeting (Jones et al 2009). Indeed, the frequency distributions of public budget changes, both in one-
country and cross-countries studies, rule out the standard incremental model lending support to leptokurtic 
distributions (Baumgartner, Foucault, and Francois 2006; Breunig and Koski 2006; John and Margetts 2003; 
Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Mortensen 2005; True et al. 2007).   
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and veto players involved in the process of global regulatory change make financial regulation 
largely immune to the punctuation-like model of change. Whereas in the standard punctuated 
model, institutional frictions beget punctuations – they can slow down change but they lead to 
bigger policy changes than in cases where external inputs would have been introduced more 
gradually, the combination of institutional frictions with the distinct type of actors involved in the 
international regulatory process prevents policy punctuations from occurring. 
Although we collectively demonstrate that the process of change in international financial rule-
making and content, and of the institutions of finance, does not fit with the punctuated model of 
policy change, we nonetheless argue that the incremental changes here examined do not rule out 
bigger and deeper transformations. This means that, in finance, paradigmatic change is less likely the 
result of an exogenous shock than is the case in the area of budgeting (Baumgartner, Foucault, and 
Francois 2006; Breunig and Koski 2006; John and Margetts 2003; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; 
Mortensen 2005; True et al. 2007) or macroeconomics (Hall 1993). In finance, as will be discussed in 
the Conclusions of this book, paradigmatic change is instead associated with incremental, 
endogenously-driven dynamics. In this light, our findings support the body of scholarship that 
suggests that radical transformations are not solely the result of the orthodox homeostatic or 
exogenously-driven punctured equilibrium model of policy change (Cashore and Howlett 2007; 
Coleman et al. 1996; Howlett 2009; Thelen 2003; Mahoney and Thelen 2010). Radical 
transformation may also result from the cumulative effects of previous policy changes, thus 
underscoring the importance of ‘process sequencing’ (Haydu 1998; Howlett 2009; Kay 2007; Thelen 
2003).  
The editors and contributors of this volume have set themselves an ambitious goal, that of speaking 
to scholars interested in the dynamics of policy change at large. We find that the importance of 
investigating factors at all levels of governance (domestic, interstate and transnational) is of 
increasing relevance to understanding policy change, especially as the type of fragmented 
governance encountered in finance against a multitude of actors and vested interests, can arguably 
be observed in other policy processes. That said, the book is primarily aimed to enrich International 
Political Economy (IPE) scholarship. Indeed, one of the motivations of our research project was the 
dissatisfaction with the treatment of the process of change in the existing IPE literature on global 
financial regulation. Specifically, existing studies offer only partial insights into the question of 
incremental change and seldom address it directly. Scholars of international financial regulation 
have focused mostly on the causes of regulatory change rather than what pattern change actually 
follows. As a result, while important insights have been developed on the actors involved in the 
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politics of reform of international financial rules and on the instruments and resources used in the 
reform process,7 we have yet to get a comprehensive picture of why and how change is sometimes 
quick and other times slow to materialise, or why, how and when it entails a profound rethink of 
previous practices or amounts to little more than small adjustments in existing instruments.  
This is not to say that existing scholarship is silent on the dynamics of policy change. To the contrary, 
several scholars have made a number of suggestions that are key to the puzzle explored in our study. 
For instance, in his work on global finance as a technical system, Porter (2003) has suggested that 
the regulation of global finance is predisposed towards incremental developmental trajectories 
because of the legacy of previous technical knowledge and patterns of collaboration. Focusing on 
governmental policy networks, Baker (2006) has suggested some of the factors that help account for 
the incremental pattern he detects in the G7 case, suggesting that incrementalism can be 
understood in light of the prevailing economic ideas and shared understandings, and the routines 
and procedures that mark G7 activity. In a similar vein, Best (2004) has drawn attention to the 
incremental nature of the shift from Keynesianism to monetarism by bringing to the surface the 
legacy of once-dominant ideas even when new ideas gain currency in academic and public circles. As 
this brief overview of the arguments on incrementalism reveals, current scholarship acknowledges 
the need to explain different dynamics of change. But we suggest that some of the explanations 
advanced to account for the incremental dynamics of change have not been fully explored, nor 
systematically tested.  
Building on these insights, the contributions to this volume share an interest in explaining the 
incremental pattern of change that has dominated the post-crisis reform agenda. Specifically, we 
argue that, in order to explain this pattern, we need to complement and expand the conventional 
focus on the actors involved in the process of regulatory change with a stronger emphasis on the 
institutional frictions that actors confront.8 These factors, which are illustrated in the following 
sections, include: the concentration of financial power in a limited number of states, vested interests 
in dominant institutional positions, gaps in implementation capacity at the domestic level, as well as 
the fragmentation and club-like nature of global financial governance.  
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This book sets out to make three main contributions to the literature on policy change and global 
financial governance. First, our study helps determine that an incremental policy change model best 
fits with the policy area of international financial regulation. This has implications for the study of 
change in financial policy and related policy areas (e.g. signalling changes in public policy priorities 
relating to access to credit, financialisation or trade-offs between stability and competitiveness) but 
also opens up potential comparative research agendas across issue-areas.  
Second, we explore the normative dimension associated with the incremental pattern of change. We 
thus engage with the question of whether incremental changes are simply a cover for status quo and 
conservative forces to prevail, a proposition supported by some of the contributions to this volume 
(in particular Botzem and Rixen). Indeed, since the publication of Lindblom’s article on the politics of 
‘muddling through’ (1959), which addressed the tenets of incrementalism as a mode of policy-
making, incrementalism has been accused of being an inherently conservative picture of the policy 
process. In this book, however, we provide a more nuanced understanding of incrementalism 
suggesting that it cannot be always and automatically equated with conservatism. Rather, as some 
contributions in this volume show (most notably Baker), in the area of international financial 
regulation, incrementalism can be a useful political strategy to offset conservative forces and may 
foreshadow more fundamental policy changes.9  
Finally, this volume puts forward an important contribution to the study of global financial 
governance in the aftermath of the global financial crisis by providing a theoretically-informed 
examination of the phenomenon of regulatory change that is meant to achieve bridge-building 
between the study of change in international political economy and comparative political economy 
(Farrell and Newmann 2011; Fioretos 2011b). Indeed, our explanation of incremental change 
borrows extensively from the insights developed within the historical institutionalist (HI) tradition on 
the study of change in domestic settings (as developed, among others, by Pierson 2004; Thelen 
1999, 2004; Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth 1992; Streeck and Thelen 2005). In particular, we build 
on recent theoretical and empirical studies that have expanded HI’s core institutionalist focus with a 
more clearly agent-centreed perspective that keeps in due consideration the dynamic relationship 
between actors and the constraints/opportunities of the environment in which they operate (Bell 
2011a; Mahoney and Thelen 2010).  
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As explained in some detail in subsequent sections, historical institutionalism holds valuable 
substantive insights and analytical tools for theorizing how incremental change occurs in 
international finance and why the international financial system may be more suited to incremental 
than radical reforms. Although we stress the relevance of HI to our empirical puzzle, it is not the 
purpose of this book to provide a manifesto for the application of HI to the study of change in global 
financial governance. Our adoption of HI is more practical than theoretical. We believe that HI 
provides substantive insights and analytical tools to investigate patterns of institutional, incremental 
development at the domestic level that can be useful in analysing patterns of institutional 
development in the international financial system too. Hence, although contributors do not 
necessarily subscribe to the historical institutionalist label, they share a substantive focus on factors 
such as power, temporal processes, institutional constraints, and inefficiency – in short, the factors 
that constitute the core of the HI tradition.  
Before proceeding, some clarifications are in order. Firstly, although our interest in incrementalism is 
accompanied by an emphasis on the constraints that influence the process of change, the role of 
agency in the reform process is in no way discounted and is a common feature in all chapters. As has 
long been noted, ‘background factors don’t do policies. Policymakers do’ (Lundquist, 1980: xiii). 
Studying actors’ preferences, motivations, strategies, and ideas is therefore of utmost importance to 
the puzzle addressed in this study. As such, the chapters in this book explore the constraints 
associated with two categories of actors: change agents and veto players. Combining the role of 
actors, which has been largely investigated in existing literature, with the constraints that actors 
face, we attempt to strike a balance between strategic action and institutional constraints.  
Secondly, it is important to clarify what type of changes in international finance we analyse. Indeed, 
one of the most common problems in the study of change is that ‘scholars are often insufficiently 
clear as to exactly what it is that they are studying’ (Capano and Howlett 2009: 3-4). 10 That is, 
significant ambiguity exists on the type and level of change under investigation. In order to sort out 
this ambiguity, in this study, we reject the distinction according to which incremental change 
indicates adaptive and reproductive minor change whereas major change indicates disruption of 
continuity. Rather, we submit, incremental change can be as transformative as major changes (see 
also Streek and Thelen 2004). We thus define incrementalism in relation to Peter Hall’s (1993; 279) 
definition of ‘normal policymaking,’ as a process that adjusts policy without challenging the overall 
terms of a given policy paradigm – at least in the short run. That is to say, incremental changes 
preserve some broad continuities with past regulatory policies. 
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 For the purposes of this study, then, incremental changes can be found at different levels – from 
formal institutions to soft governance arrangements and norms (Abbott and Snidal 2000). In 
particular, some of the contributors to this study analyse formal institutions and rules (Quaglia in 
this volume) as well as looser forms of cooperation such as standards and international early 
warning systems (Carstensen in this volume). Other contributors focus on either the changes in 
decision-making practices in financial regulation (Botzem in this volume) or the changes in the 
prevailing norms that inform international financial regulation and supervision (Baker this volume). 
Further, a group of contributions analyses the changes in the distribution of resources (material and 
immaterial) among different actors and stakeholders participating in international financial policy-
making (Pagliari and Young in this volume). Finally, some contributions analyse areas of finance 
where contentious political factors are most pronounced whether defined in interstate 
competitiveness terms or at the domestic level (Rixen and Kjar in this volume).   
The remaining part of this introductory chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, we 
analyse existing literature on the evolution of global financial regulation and how it addresses and/or 
explains the incremental pattern of change in the post-crisis regulatory reform process. In Section 3, 
we develop  the  analytical  tools and  concepts  that  are  taken  up  in  the  volume’s  case  studies.  
In particular, we delineate the set of factors shaping the pattern of incremental change in global 
financial governance. Section 4 explains the relevance of studying the evolution of global financial 
governance by using the analytical concepts and methods developed within historical 
institutionalism. Section 5 provides an overview of the book.  
 
2. What do we know thus far? The actors of global financial regulation 
The question of who shapes international financial rules and how the process of rule-creation takes 
place has long interested IPE scholars. Since the pioneering works of Kapstein (1989, 1992) on the 
negotiations of the Basel accord, scholarship on international finance has produced important forays 
into the political and market pressures that shape international financial rules and harmonization 
(Simmons and Elkins 2004; Simmons 2001; Cerny 1994).  In particular, scholars have assessed the 
role played by factors such as the structural power of the United States (Strange 1988), capital 
mobility (Andrews 1994), domestic societal interests (Singer 2007; Seabrooke 2006) and private 
sector lobbying (Underhill 1997; Gill 1990) among others. In a review of the literature post-financial 
crisis, Helleiner and Pagliari (2011) suggest three distinct explanations for the evolution of 
international financial regulation based on the policy arenas that drive the process of rule-creation 
and change: interstate, domestic, and transnational explanations. Interestingly, and in spite of the 
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significant differences among them, the three explanations share an emphasis on the actors involved 
in the regulatory processes and the resources that they possess to influence it.  
For instance, the studies that fall within the first explanation place emphasis on a specific category of 
actors:  leading states or great powers. In this reading, market size and adjustment costs are the 
crucial resources these actors possess. As Drezner (2007: 28) explains, the logic that unpins 
interstate explanations is ‘market size [which] alters the distribution of payoffs by reducing the 
rewards of regulatory coordination for large market states and increasing the rewards for small 
market states. This gives the great powers a bargaining advantage and alters the perception of other 
actors so as to reinforce the likelihood of regulatory coordination at a great power’s status quo 
ante.’ Furthermore, market size endows great powers with the option of economic coercion as a 
way of convincing other actors in the system to change their financial rules in line with those 
preferred by the great powers. As a result, changes in international financial rules and institutions 
are closely dependent on the national interests of leading states.  
Interstate explanations have several weaknesses, including a limited ability to account for states’ 
interests over time and a neglect of domestic societal interests (Büthe and Mattli 2011). For our 
purposes, it is worth noting that, although interstate explanations do not explicitly address the 
question of incremental change, they offers some insights in the post-crisis context. For instance, a 
common theme in the scholarship is that financial regulation will be significantly enhanced when 
leading states have a common interest in more stringent regulation. Otherwise, leading states act to 
narrow the scope of regulation (Wood 2005). But the logic that underpins interstate explanations 
does not help distinguish between the conditions under which the regulation of finance will be 
modified incrementally, suddenly or be maintained as is.  Additionally, such explanations underplay 
the role of weaker actors in influencing international regulatory outcomes (Sharman 2006). Yet it has 
become important to take the role of such actors into account, especially in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis. Following years of preaching to emerging market countries about 
internationally recognized standards of financial conduct (Walter 2008), the crisis erupted in the so-
called ‘sophisticated’ financial markets. The reform process has thus far enlarged membership of the 
financial governance infrastructure to include more emerging market countries and it is yet possible 
that some of these countries, such as China, will become more assertive in influencing the 
international regulatory debate.11 Furthermore, one of the effects of the crisis has been that of 
rebalancing power in favour of emerging markets’ financial institutions, many of which, by market 
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capitalization, now figure among the top 20 world banks – with Chinese banks occupying the three 
top spots of the ranking in 2009.12 
The second set of explanations of international financial regulation shift the emphasis to domestic-
level actors – be they domestic regulators (Singer 2007) or financial institutions (Busch 2009; Mügge 
2006). Domestic actors are deemed able to shape international regulatory outcomes because of the 
key political resources they possess. Within the domestic explanation of international regulatory 
outcomes, significant attention is also placed on the institutional specificities of national capitalisms 
(Hall and Soskice 2011). For instance, Hubert Zimmermann (2009) has explained the international 
regulatory preferences of Germany and the UK in 2008-09 as they relate to the specific 
characteristics of their national capitalisms – coordinated and liberal market respectively. Similarly 
Manuela Moschella (2011b) has explored how the EU international regulatory preferences in the 
immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis were significantly shaped by the apparent 
discrediting of the UK ‘liberal’ model of capitalism in favour of the Franco-German ‘regulated’ model 
(see also Quaglia forthcoming and, on pre-crisis coalitions, Quaglia 2010). 
Although domestic explanations do not explicitly engage with the question of what causes 
incremental financial regulatory change, they also contain some important insights. For instance, in 
his study of domestic regulators, Singer has identified a trade-off between stability and 
competitiveness in determining more or less international regulatory cooperation across three areas 
of finance – banking, securities, and the insurance sector, suggesting a pattern of international 
regulatory change that is highly dependent on the preferences of the regulators in the leading 
financial centres. This approach shares many of the drawbacks of interstate explanations, while also 
failing to account for the bargaining and deliberative dynamics that take place at the international 
level. The same problem affects those explanations that put the emphasis on the characteristics of 
domestic capitalisms; they are strong in highlighting domestic preferences but do not provide a 
satisfactory explanation for the process of decision-making at the international level.  
This shortcoming is largely addressed by the third set of explanations identified by Helleiner and 
Pagliari (2011), transnational explanations that explicitly focus on the processes and dynamics that 
takes place in international regulatory fora. This strand of scholarship explains that the evolution of 
the international financial regulatory regime is heavily influenced by the activities of actors that 
operate across rather than through governments, whether transgovernmental networks that 
overcome the domestic/international divide (Baker 2006; Porter 2005) or transnational policy 
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communities in which the divide is not solely domestic/international but also public/private (Tsingou 
2009) and where specialist expert knowledge prevails (Botzem 2012).  
We believe that scholars adopting transnational explanations most clearly address the issue of 
incremental change. Baker’s (2006) and Porter’s (2003) insights on incremental evolution in global 
financial governance as a consequence of technical authority and esprit de corps have already been 
referred to. Likewise, in her account of the influence of private actors after the crisis, Tsingou (2009) 
attributed the incremental pattern of regulatory reform, in spite of the worst financial upheaval 
since the 1930s depression, to the enduring power of transnational private interests as these are 
firmly engrained among the members of the policy community in charge of the rules of global 
finance and have the capacity to constrain the spectrum of policy ideas discussed and adopted. 
There are, nevertheless, two problems with this set of approaches when our focus shifts away from 
actors and towards understanding the nature of change. The first is that the suggestions on 
incremental change are spot insights rather than clearly developed hypotheses that inform a 
research agenda on the incremental pattern of change. The second is that transnational 
explanations have primarily focused on the actors involved in the international regulatory process 
but have paid insufficient attention to the institutional frictions and actor interaction that constrain 
the activities of the actors analysed.  
In what follows, we aim to fill this gap by developing a theoretical framework able to account 
systematically for the incremental dynamics of change. We take into account the role of agency in 
the process of change by investigating change agents and veto players, but we also endeavour to put 
greater emphasis on the institutional frictions that, combined with the activity of transgovernmental 
networks and transnational communities, help explain incrementalism in the international financial 
regulatory process.  
 
3. Explaining incremental change in the post-crisis financial regulatory reforms: redressing the 
balance between actors and institutions 
The theoretical framework suggested here takes as a starting point an agent-centred constructivist-
oriented approach. Since ideas exist in a competitive marketplace where alternative ideas are always 
available, actors frame and manipulate ideas to mobilize support (Blyth 2003). In other words, the 
process of change requires actors sponsoring their ideas and aiming at persuading other agents 
(Widmaier, Blyth, and Seabrooke 2007; see also Chwieroth 2010). The importance of active policy 
entrepreneurs and the ideas they support is widely recognized in the literature on the creation of 
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global regulation. As Mattli and Woods (2009: 17) put it, ‘public and private entrepreneurs play key 
roles in mobilising opposition, and ideas may offer the necessary frames for pro-change interests 
and glue for coalitions’. The role of policy entrepreneurs acquires key importance in the policy area 
under investigation where the uncertainty associated with financial crises strengthens the 
importance of actors able to interpret them, diagnose their causes, and propose blueprints for their 
solutions (Blyth 2002, 2007; Baker forthcoming). In short, economic crises do not speak for 
themselves (Hay 1996) and their effects do not automatically lead to new policy and ideational 
consensus (Grabel 2003; Moschella 2010).  
 
As previously discussed, for the purposes of this study, we identify two distinct categories of actors 
that help explain processes of change in global financial regulation: change agents and veto players. 
The identity of these actors, we submit, can be most diverse: in different times and different 
circumstances, governments, societal interests, or transnational technocrats can play the roles of 
change agents and veto players. Assigning roles is therefore a matter of empirical investigation and 
is not defined ex ante in our theoretical framework.  
Whereas change agents lead the process of change by being explicit advocates of specific changes or 
hidden supporters, veto players, in principle, aim at maintaining the status quo in order to preserve 
their privileges and safeguard their interests. In the area of financial reform, several studies have 
shown how special interests are able to shape rules and institutions in narrow and effectively closed 
policy communities (Moran 1990; Underhill 1995; Coleman 1996). These actors may sustain the 
reproduction of existing institutions over time, vetoing or opposing change that affects them. 
Although veto players generally oppose change, it is also plausible to think of them as actors 
expressly promoting change. This happens when veto players realise that regulatory change is the 
only way to maintain their privileged position. For instance, in the context of financial policy, if 
actors do not adapt to shifting financial innovations and changing economic conditions, the risk of 
losing their privileged position is the highest. Hence, it is possible that ‘the very industries that 
benefited from regulation in the past lobby for change’ (Vogel 1996: 13).  It is also important to note 
that, similarly to change agents, veto players can be more or less explicit in their strategies. 
While we take as a starting point of our analysis the role of agents as in much of the IPE 
constructivist scholarship reviewed in the previous section, we complement the analysis on the role 
of the agents with a careful examination of the institutional constraints and opportunities that the 
actors face in their activity, including actor interactions.13 In doing so, we build from important, 
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recent attempts that have drawn attention to agent-centred model of institutional change (Bell 
2011a, forthcoming). That is to say, we acknowledge that agents are the ultimate propellant of 
change but also that institutional environments shape agents’ ability and discretion. Hence, to 
explain change, ‘we need to model agents both as partially constrained by their immediate 
institutional contexts and also as operating in institutional and structural settings that constantly 
evolve and potentially open up new opportunities for agents.’ (Bell 2011a: 898). 
 
In what follows, we therefore concentrate on the dynamic interaction between agents and 
institutions that help explain incrementalism in global financial regulatory reform processes. Since 
the existing literature, as discussed in the previous section, is extensive on the actors involved in 
international regulatory processes, the factors identified below focus on the institutional dimension 
of the process of change. Nevertheless, as the empirical chapters show, it is the combination 
between the specific agents involved in global finance and the distinct institutional frictions of global 
financial regulation that explain the prevalence of incrementalism over punctuations.14 
The institutional frictions that are relevant to the process of global financial regulatory change are 
grouped into three blocs according to the strand of the global finance literature they mainly refer to 
(Table 1).15 Note, however, that whereas some factors are specific to one of the three political 
arenas of global financial regulation – interstate, domestic and transnational –, other factors do not 
relate to a single arena only. For instance, although we discuss the institutional frictions associated 
with the presence of vested interests in the section dedicated to the domestic political arena, vested 
interests can be found at both the intergovernmental and transnational levels. Likewise, the 
discussion of ideas and routines as institutional frictions is conducted in the section on the 
transnational arena although these frictions are present in the intergovernmental and domestic 
arenas too. In short, the typology proposed below is an analytical tool that assists us in discussing a 
number of frictions that help account for incremental change in global financial regulation but 
should not be considered as a way to exclusively assign a specific friction to each of the three 
political arenas. Furthermore, the list is neither exhaustive nor exclusive. It is also worth noting that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
features of the political context and properties of the institutions themselves [are] critically important 
explaining institutional change’ and how the type of change actors and the different strategies they adopt are 
likely to differ in specific institutional settings. 
14
 There are studies that attempt to distinguish between the factors that influence the outcome of regulation – 
i.e. whether public interest or captured regulation prevails (see Mattli and Woods 2009 for instance). To our 
knowledge, however, no similar attempt has been made to systematically analyse and test the conditions that 
help explain the dynamics of regulation.   
15
 Note, however, that we also move beyond the scholarship explicitly reviewed in the previous section. 
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the factors identified below may pertain to one of the stages of the regulatory decision-making 
process (agenda-setting, negotiations, implementation and enforcement), whereas other factors are 
present in more than one of the stages. Finally, whereas some constraints are formal, others are 
more informal.  
Table 1.1 Institutional frictions and potential paths to incremental change in global financial 
governance  
  Institutional friction Potential Path to Incremental Change  
Interstate dimension Concentration of financial power  Change agents adopt limited reforms to escape veto  
Domestic dimension Vested interests in dominant institutional position Veto players adapt to new challenges to maintain privileged 
position  
Change actors change slowly to avoid overt opposition 
  
Gaps in implementation capacity Veto players lengthen policy implementation 
Change actors build implementation capacity 
  
Transnational dimension Fragmented and club-like global financial governance  Change agents seek support across several regulatory bodies 




Change agents roadtest new  ideas and  build institutional support  
 
In what follows, we discuss each of the identified institutional frictions in turn. In examining their 
characteristics, we also suggest in what ways they are likely to be associated with incremental 
dynamics of change. That is to say, we provide some illustrations of how the presence of specific 
institutional friction may prevent the emergence of paradigmatic changes. It is important to note, 
however, that these suggestions are just illustrative and indicative. As the empirical case studies that 
follow indicate, and as we discuss in the conclusions, there are several pathways to incremental 
change and, above all, it is the interaction between change actors and veto players, on the one hand, 
and institutions, on the other, that shape the pattern of regulatory dynamics.  
The interstate dimension and processes of incremental change 
Although the role of experts and technocrats is crucial in the creation of global financial regulation, 
the role of governments should not be underestimated (see Rixen in this volume). On the one hand, 
many important decisions are taken through intergovernmental bargaining, where states attempt to 
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attend to a specific national interest. On the other hand, the implementation of global financial 
regulation is closely dependent on domestic regulatory regimes, as will be explained at greater 
length below. Furthermore, since regulatory reform is about more than liberating markets, state 
actors are key factors in reforms because they  address two things that are more relevant to states 
than any other actors: ‘finding new ways to raise government revenue and designing new 
mechanisms of policy implementation’ (Vogel 1996: 19). 
In the interstate arena, the main institutional friction that helps explain the prevalence of 
incrementalism in the process of global regulatory reform is the concentration of financial power – 
and associated veto power – in only a few states. For instance, those states with the largest markets 
occupy a privileged position in global negotiations because they may veto decisions that could 
damage their financial interests by using the threat of closing their markets or that of going-it-alone. 
As a result, change is often based on the lowest common denominator among state preferences to 
escape veto players and deadlock (also Quaglia in this volume). That is to say, for regulatory changes 
to be adopted, change agents should not support changes that significantly depart from the rules 
and practices in place in the dominant financial markets. In particular, the transformation of global 
financial rules would need not to impose significant costs for the most powerful states in the system. 
This limits the range of reformatory policy options, thus giving rise to incremental patterns of 
change. 
The domestic dimension and processes of incremental change 
Within the domestic policy-making arena, two main institutional obstacles to regulatory reform are 
the presence of vested interests and the lack of implementation capacity. The first is closely related 
to the concept of institutions adopted in this study: the institutions in global financial governance 
can be conceived as the legacies of political struggles. This means that certain actors are advantaged 
by existing institutions and have a vested interest in their survival. This is the case of the financial 
industry in our area of investigation – although the crisis has altered their influence too (Pagliari and 
Yound in this volume). Furthermore, once an institution is in place, actors make greater relation-
specific investments, and this develops an interest in preserving current institutions (Pierson 2000a, 
2000b, also Gourevitch 1999). For instance, as David Lake (1999: 46) has noted, since  private actors 
‘have grown out of and adapted to the current [global] governance structure,’ they ‘have little 
interest in seeing it overturned or even significantly modified’. But domestic societal actors can also 
benefit from such arrangements; when the interests of powerful electoral blocks coincide with those 
of particular financial institutions, enacting reform and changing the status quo can lead to intense 
political struggles (Kjar in this volume).  
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Although the actors that benefit from existing institutions prefer the status quo, change is still 
possible. For instance, actors that benefit from existing institutions may adapt those institutions in 
order not to lose their comparative advantage. This is particularly the case in a rapidly-innovating 
sector like finance. Indeed, faced with changing economic conditions or with shifting financial 
innovations, veto players may realize that their advantage is better preserved by adapting existing 
rules and institutions rather than by maintaining the status quo. It is also conceivable that veto 
players would accept short-term sacrifices to their interests in order to maintain long-term coalition 
success (Scharpf 2000: 782). It is within this space that changes may take place in an incremental 
fashion. Indeed, the logic is that the actors that have an interest in a specific institution will prefer an 
incremental adaptation in order to control the process of change. Following this thinking, we can 
interpret the limited but nevertheless substantive reforms at the European level as a process that 
addresses some criticisms while deflecting attempts at more radical transformation (see Quaglia in 
this volume). 
Next to a process driven by the actors that benefit from existing institutions, the actors that are 
disadvantaged may also drive the process of change; as Thelen (1999) has noted, losers from an 
institutional arrangement do not disappear. They also adapt and work to transform this 
arrangement, including via the formation of coalitions with other actors (Pagliari and Young in this 
volume). This has important implications for the dynamics of policy change. Indeed, if change agents 
occupy a disadvantaged position in the regulatory status quo, they will enact change in slow and 
incremental steps in order to avoid overt opposition and political blockages by the actors that are 
privileged. The timing of change is also slowed down because agents need to mobilise and nurture 
political support against entrenched interests. This hypothesis fits with the well-established finding 
in domestic political systems that ‘countries with many veto players will engage in only incremental 
policy changes’ (Tsebelis 2000: 464).  
The second institutional friction that shapes the pattern of global financial regulatory change relates 
to organisational and bureaucratic capacity. Indeed, reforms at the international level often depend 
for their implementation on domestic regulatory authorities and bureaucratic apparatuses. The 
capabilities and organisation of these regimes therefore provide incentives for and constraints on 
what governments can put into practice (Raustalia 1997). Furthermore, in the area of finance, the 
domestic level assumes a key role as many of the global rules of finance are flexible best practice 
standards rather than firm rules per se (Tsingou 2008); they are interpreted in regulatory terms and 
implemented within a domestic setting. The discretion accorded to domestic bureaucratic systems in 
implementing global financial regulation therefore magnifies the importance of the former and 
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bears important implications for the patterns of policy change in at least two respects. First, veto 
players may oppose change at the implementation stage, lobbying domestic regulators for 
lengthening application of internationally-negotiated rules. Second, change agents need to develop 
the necessary institutional infrastructure before enacting their preferred policy changes (see Baker 
in this volume)  
The transnational dimension and processes of incremental change 
Finally, and with particular reference to the transnational dimension of global financial regulation, 
the institutional frictions that are more likely to shape the pattern of regulatory change in an 
incremental fashion are the institutional framework and the ideational orientation of global financial 
governance.16The governance framework of global finance is of crucial importance to explain 
patterns of change. Two features are of particular relevance: the fragmented nature of the global 
regulatory regime and the club-like quality of cooperation. The governance of international finance 
is indeed distributed among multiple transnational public and private international institutions 
(Porter 2005) where no single regulatory body clearly dominates. These bodies include the 
international financial institutions, international groupings of regulators and supervisors such as the 
Basel Committee, IOSCO, and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).17 The 
governance framework also includes private sector actors, some of them global representative 
groupings for banking and other financial industries, others more issue-driven and responsible for 
standard setting, such as the IASB. While some of these bodies have distinct competences, they also 
share responsibilities. This has a number of consequences for the dynamics of regulatory change. 
Firstly, the development of new policies requires consensus in more than one regulatory body. For 
instance, the task of developing regulatory standards for SIFIs is shared among the FSB and the Basel 
Committee (which will set additional capital requirements). Under this fragmented institutional 
framework, change is more likely to be incremental. As a result, change agents will need to mobilise 
support in several regulatory bodies while turf battles and overlapping competences offer veto 
players multiple opportunities for influence. A similar institutional patchwork can be observed in the 
ongoing discussions about resolution regimes (Carstensen in this volume).  
Next to the fragmented nature of global financial governance, its club-like quality also affects 
patterns of regulatory change. Policy networks at the transnational level usually operate through 
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 Vogel (1996) adopts a similar distinction between regime organization and regime orientation, although he 
refers to domestic regulatory systems. 
17
 The World Bank, for instance, assists member countries in the design and implementation of policies that 
strengthen the domestic financial system and helps countries in identifying risks in this system. The Basel 
Committee, IOSCO and IAIS, in turn, provide specialised knowledge by setting the standards in the field of 
banking supervision, securities and insurance supervision respectively. 
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informal and exclusive processes where expertise and socialization are critical resources for 
influencing regulatory outcomes. These features, we suggest, tilt the balance in favour of 
incrementalism at least for two reasons.  
First, this peculiar structure shields the global regulatory debate and decision-making from public 
scrutiny and pressures (housing finance is a notable exception as shown by Kjar in this volume). The 
comparison with other policy fields may be of help to clarify this point. For instance, Hall’s 
explanation of paradigmatic change in Britain’s economic policymaking emphasizes the role played 
by actors outside the community of policy experts. In his view, paradigmatic change was ultimately 
possible because the contest over policy choice spilled beyond the boundaries of the Treasury.18 
Similar emphasis on the attention to an issue by actors that do not belong to the community of 
experts is also present in several studies that have analysed a variety of policy sectors - from nuclear 
policy (Baumgartner and Jones 1991) to civil rights, environment, energy, transportation and foreign 
trade policies to provide a few examples (see the contributions in Baumgartner et al. 2011). In 
contrast, in the policy field of global financial regulation, the kind of public attention, mobilisation 
and pressure that these studies identify is most difficult to achieve. As a result, change is ‘managed’ 
by a closed policy community that is likely to embark on small changes whose scope and 
consequences it can control (Botzem in this volume), and prefer long timeframes of implementation. 
Second, the club-like nature of global finance is a likely source of incrementalism in that policy 
communities responsible for financial regulation tend to share common mindsets and normative 
orientations about the proper scope, goals, and instruments of financial regulation and are also 
affected by ‘cognitive locks’ regarding appropriate courses of action (Blyth 2002).19 Since these ideas 
set the parameters of possible and appropriate behaviour, they also constitute a major obstacle to 
rapid and radical policy changes, especially given the rarity of the moments in which new ideas 
suddenly displace old ones, leading to abrupt changes in behaviour and policy. Most of the time,  
policy changes take place within the parameters set by existing ideational frameworks. The 
‘ideational inertia’ is magnified in the presence of well-developed agencies and bureaucracies as is 
the case in financial regulation. Under these circumstances, ‘any efforts to change have to first 
overcome the power of habitual perceptions, emotions, and practices’ (Hopf 2010: 540).  
Ideational factors therefore lead to incremental change because new ideas need to be developed 
and accepted within a policy community. Furthermore, to win the support of the ‘experts’, new 
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 On this point, see also Blyth (forthcoming).  
19
 According to Vogel (1996: 20), these beliefs usually reflect ‘actors’ adherence to broad doctrine, such as 
economic liberalism; their predisposition toward certain functional tasks …; and their commitment to specific 
policy mechanisms’. 
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ideas also need to be tested against empirical evidence and historical experience (Baker in this 
volume). This is especially the case in global finance where technical knowledge is a key component 
of its governance (Porter 2003).  Indeed, the process of change in policy communities made up by 
experts relies heavily on the process of road-testing and experimenting with new ideas in the face of 
empirical anomalies before coming to abandon old ideas.  Next to the steps necessary to test and 
develop new ideas, the process of change follows an incremental pattern also because policy 
entrepreneurs have to establish institutional support for ideas to translate into policy action 
(Widmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke 2007: 754). In global finance, this means that ideas have to gain an 
institutional presence in the regulatory bodies that drive the process of change. For instance, for the 
ascendance of the ideas on macroprudential regulation, a key factor has been their diffusion from 
the Bank for International Settlements to other professional ecologies (Baker forthcoming; 
Seabrooke and Tsingou 2009). In other words, the development and acceptance of new ideas take 
place through a drawn-out sequential process (Blyth 2002) where the stages of collapse and 
consolidation of ideas are required for an appropriate conceptualization of change (Legro 2000). 
Seen from this perspective, even the alleged Bretton Woods ‘moment’ was not the kind of rapid and 
radical change that is usually portrayed. Rather, it ‘took place well over a decade after the 
momentous financial crises of the early 1930s. The delay was not just a product of the unique 
historical circumstances of the era. It took time for old ideas and practices to lose their legitimacy 
and for new ones to emerge as models for the future’ (Helleiner 2010: 624). 
In conclusion, in this section, we have identified a number of institutional frictions that, when 
combined with the activity of change agents and veto players, help explain the dynamics of change, 
in this case incrementalism. The institutional frictions identified are those typical of the area of 
international financial regulation and may help explain the prevalence of incrementalism over the 
alternative punctuated model.  
By emphasizing institutional constraints and frictions, we take inspiration from most of the 
substantive and analytical features developed by historical institutionalism. While HI has been 
developed in the subfield of Comparative Politics to explain the evolution of domestic institutions, 
we submit that HI holds key value for the study of IPE in general and the study of the evolution of 
global finance in particular (see also Fioretos 2011a). In the following section, we explain how HI is 
relevant to our study and examine its potential contribution to research agendas relating to global 
finance, in line with similar efforts to apply HI to explanations of IO behavior (Moschella 2011a; 
Rixen, Viola and Zürn forthcoming), tax policies (Rixen 2011) and multilateral cooperation (Fioretos 
2011b). We also identify the areas where we move beyond HI or redress it by mixing the insights 
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developed in other theoretical traditions. In particular, we highlight the ways in which HI may 
usefully complement agent-centred approaches in the explanation of policy changes in global 
financial regulation. 
 
4. Historical Institutionalism and Change in Global Financial Governance  
What is the advantage of borrowing from historical institutionalism to explain the empirical puzzle of 
incremental change in global financial governance? There are at least three main reasons as to why 
HI is relevant to the puzzle addressed in this study: the focus of the research agenda, the approach 
to empirical problems, and the engagement with questions of efficiency and legitimacy that gets us 
to reflect on the normative dimension of global financial governance. All three factors helpfully 
complement agent-centred constructivist scholarship.  
First, HI is relevant to our study because of its research agenda. Indeed, the core of HI’s research 
agenda revolves around the question of institutional evolution over time (Pierson 2004; Pierson and 
Skocpol 2001; Thelen 2004; Sanders 2006). That is to say, ‘the substantive profile of historical 
institutionalism is characterised by attention to large questions with an explicit temporal scope that 
concern the creation, reproduction, development, and structure of institutions over time’ (Fioretos 
2011b: 372). As such, the insights developed in HI can help explain the pattern of institutional 
evolution we observe in global finance. The understanding of institutions in HI is also relevant to our 
study. In contrast to more rationalist understandings according to which institutions are exogenous 
coordination mechanisms that generate or sustain equilibria, HI conceives institutions as the legacies 
of political struggles that emerge from and are embedded in concrete temporal processes (Thelen 
1999: 382).20 That is, institutions emerge from particular historical conflicts and constellations (see 
also Steinmo 1993). In a more expanded version that borrows from sociological institutionalism, 
institutions are also viewed as a set of shared understandings that affect the way problems are 
perceived and solutions are sought (as in Katzenstein 1996).21 From an HI perspective, then, 
institutions do more than channel policy and structure political conflict: they define preferences.  
The conception of institutions that characterizes HI heavily informs our analysis. Indeed, the 
contributions to this volume focus on a variety of institutions – formal institutions and rules 
(Botzem; Quaglia; Rixen), regimes (Carstensen) and supervisory principles (Baker);  and the policy 
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 For a discussion of each of the three strands in HI see Hall and Taylor (1996). Other useful reviews include 
Lichbach and Zuckerman (2002), Immergut (1998), and Kato (1996). 
21
 In new institutionalism in sociology, institutions are conceived as ‘shared cultural scripts’, ‘shared cognitions’ 
and ‘interpretive frames’ of the way the world works (Meyer and Rowen 1991).   
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practices and strategies of actors (Pagliari and Young; Kjar) – which are conceived as something 
more substantial than mere coordination mechanisms among the actors involved. From our 
perspective, the institutions that help govern global financial governance are the result of political 
struggles and temporal processes that crystallise interests as well as routines and habits. 
Furthermore, the institutions we study are not external to the actors that seek to change them (or 
oppose change). Rather, actors act within the institutions, their strategies and motives are shared by 
them, influencing the dynamics of change itself.   
An additional practical contribution of HI to our study is its focus on the incremental pattern of 
change. HI has long been seen to have a bias towards explaining stability rather than change and for 
privileging structure over agency (see discussion in Crouch and Farell 2004; Katzneslon 2003) and 
indeed, HI’s emphasis on path-dependency and mechanisms of reproduction (Pierson 2000a; 
Mahoney 2000) has led to powerful explanations of institutional stability and persistence.22 At the 
risk of simplifying a much more nuanced debate, two mechanisms are usually identified in explaining 
institutional stability. The first mechanism is strictly connected to the distributional outcome of 
institutions. Since specific institutions benefit some groups more than others, those who are 
advantaged by the existing institution will struggle to preserve it. The second mechanism, which 
draws from the economic institutionalist literature (Arthur 1995; David 1985; North 1990), revolves 
around the notion of increasing returns (Pierson 2000a). Since in politics, the creation of new 
institutions requires overcoming the barriers to collective action and is generally characterised by 
high start-up costs, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations, the introduction of new 
institutions will be the most unlikely. In contrast, institutions that succeed in crossing these initial 
thresholds should be expected to have a good chance of persisting for very long periods of time 
(Pierson 2000b: 78). 
By focusing on the mechanisms of reproduction, HI has long been criticized for not having been 
conducive to satisfactory explanations of institutional change.23 However, HI is now a tradition that 
is able to explain change by having identified several mechanisms that undermine path-dependence 
processes (Pierson 2004; Thelen 1999, 2004) and by focusing more on the behaviour of political 
actors that help shape change (see Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010). In 
particular, the causes of change have been found in the same mechanisms that ensure institutional 
reproduction so that path dependency contains both elements of continuity and structured change 
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 In the fields of American Politics and Comparative Politics see, for example, Pierson (1994) Skocpol (1992), 
Collier and Collier (1991) and Hall and Soskice (2001); in International Relations, see Krasner (1988) and Spruyt 
(1994). 
23
 Bell (2011a) offers a comprehensive discussion of some of these criticisms but also shows why these matter 
for HI less than it sometimes appears by reminding us of the importance of agency in much HI scholarship. 
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(Thelen 1999: 384). Institutional change is not conceived as a dichotomous variable but as a 
continuous interaction between continuity and change, which gives rise to an incremental pattern of 
change (Thelen 1999). Building on these insights, scholars working within the HI tradition have 
uncovered a variety of forms of incremental change that stand in opposition to exogenously-driven 
changes. These forms include, among others, layering, conversion, drift, and displacement (Streeck 
and Thelen 2005; Hacker 2004; Mahoney and Thelen 2010).24 Although incremental, the processes 
of change identified by HI scholars are regarded as being able to bring about profound 
transformations (Thelen 2003; Mahoney and Thelen 2010).25  
The second practical contribution of HI to our work regards its approach to theorizing change. In 
particular, we share with HI the methodological approach that begins with the analysis of empirical 
puzzles that emerge from observed events or comparisons (Thelen 1999: 373). Indeed, most HI 
studies begin with a question on an empirical puzzle – be it different levels of taxation (Steinmo 
1993), or vocational training regimes and party systems across countries (Thelen 2004; Collier and 
Collier 1991). In a similar vein, we begin with empirical puzzles that emerge from observed events, in 
our case, the global financial crisis and the ensuing pattern of incremental change in the reform 
process. Our study, like most HI, places significant attention on historical contextualization and 
temporality, the notion that the timing and sequence of events shape political trajectories by 
conditioning the interests of and options available to actors in contemporary reform processes 
(Pierson 2000a, 2004). Temporality and sequence are also key in global financial regulatory 
processes.26 Indeed, global financial governance arrangements are complex in terms of analytical 
purchase and implementation capacity. Thus, changing them requires the existence of a number of 
preconditions. For instance, adopting a macroprudential approach to financial regulation and 
supervision requires well-developed analytical frameworks, expertise, and organisational 
infrastructure to analyse the financial system as a whole (Baker this volume; Moschella 2011a). 
Likewise, the design of capital controls is influenced by administrative capacities of different 
agencies, institutional and legal constraints, and other country-specific factors (Ostry et al. 2011). 
The existence of the required knowledge and administrative capacities cannot be assumed; rather, 
they are more likely to be built over time. 
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 For a full discussion of these forms of incremental change see, for instance, Mahoney and Thelen 2010: Ch. 
1. 
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 Other examples of small changes leading to change in policy goals include Coleman et al (1996) on 
agricultural policy change, Capano (2003) on the Italian administrative reform, Posner (2007) on financial 
integration in the EU, and Moschella (2011) on IMF surveillance. 
26
 On global regulation as made up of several stages, see also Mattli and Wood 2009, and Abbott and Snidal 
2009. 
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In addition to sequence and temporality, another crucial insight of HI, which fits well with our case, 
is the interaction and interdependencies among different institutional subsystems. Indeed, HI 
conceives of institutions not only in isolation but also as embedded in a wider institutional 
configuration whose pieces, which emerged at different points in time, ‘do not necessarily fit 
together into a coherent, self-reinforcing, let alone functional, whole’ (Thelen 1999: 382), but do 
clash  with each other. For instance, Streeck (1997) has shown the ways in which industrial-relations 
institutions created problems and pressures for the stability of other institutions, especially 
vocational education and social welfare institutions. 
This insight also applies to the area of global finance, where different sectors (banking, securities, 
insurance) are regulated differently at the global level. Variations affect (1) the actors involved, from 
the international financial institutions to international groupings of regulators and supervisors, (2) 
the degree of formal institutional cooperation, from formal treaties to voluntary standards, and (3) 
the degree of private sector authority as compared to the public sector (Cutler et al. 1999; Graz and 
Nölke 2008). The governance of global finance is therefore characterized by multiple, but closely-
related regulatory regimes, similar to what Keohane and Victor (2011) call ‘regime complexes’. As a 
result, as in the interdependencies among different institutional subsystems identified by HI 
scholars, change in one area of governance may have implications for another area. Furthermore, 
changes in the broader institutional configuration (for instance, in terms of new ideas about how to 
govern financial markets) may well have repercussions on the trajectory of change of single 
governance regimes.  
Finally, HI contains important insights that can get us to critically reflect on questions of efficiency 
and legitimacy in global financial governance. Having expressly challenged the functionalist view of 
institutional development, according to which ‘outcome X (an institution, policy, or organization, for 
instance) exists because it serves function Y’ (Pierson 2000c: 476), one of the key insights of HI 
scholarship is that the process of adaptation of existing institutions is inefficient because actors work 
within constraints that are defined by the past. Stickiness, path dependency, and vested interests 
are the key factors here. A famous instance is that of the QWERTY keyboard, which David (1985) 
argued illustrated the ways in which a technology that gains an initial advantage over alternatives 
prevails over time despite the greater efficiency of alternative technologies. Thus, ‘the outcome is 
that patterns of adaptation that would ensure greater collective efﬁciency often do not occur, that 
positions of privilege and divisions of labour regularly persist though relative balances of power shift, 
and that institutions frequently outlive their original rationale’ (Fioretos 2011b: 376). 
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These insights are particularly crucial for the process of change in global financial governance: as 
anticipated by HI, interest groups often see great benefits in reproducing existing arrangements 
rather than changing them; and global financial governance mechanisms may remain little altered 
despite a new balance of power that in principle can favour emerging markets. In short, HI alerts 
scholars interested in the politics of global financial regulation of the strength of the forces that 
oppose change and of the implications of such conservatism for the legitimacy of the global financial 
system.   
In conclusion, HI holds valuable substantive insights and analytical tools to theorise change in global 
finance and explain why the financial system is more likely to evolve through incremental rather 
than radical reforms. This is not to suggest that the insights developed within the HI scholarship can 
be uncritically applied to the area of global financial regulation or that HI simply holds the key to the 
explanation of change in global financial regulation. More narrowly, what we want to suggest is that 
HI offers the missing element for explanations of change in IPE. Indeed, as previously discussed, the 
most important and recent studies of policy change in IPE have emphasised the role of actors and 
their interpretation of reality to account for institutional variance after moments of uncertainty, 
including wars and economic crises (Widmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke 2007). These studies certainly 
deserve credit, including for demonstrating the crucial importance of actors and their ideas in an 
academic field that has long been dominated by materialist explanations. Nevertheless, 
constructivist accounts of the process of change in the international economy have somehow 
neglected some of the key institutional factors that interact with agency to bring about change (also 
Bell 2011a). By focusing on this neglected dimension, which stands at the core of HI scholarship, we 
therefore aim at redressing the balance between agency and the institutions within which agents 
operate.  This effort, we submit, helps us provide a thorough explanation of processes of change. 
Whereas the focus on actors’ ideas may well answer the question of why change is initiated, the 
focus on institutional frictions allows us to focus on answering the question of how change takes 
place: whether punctuations or incrementalism prevails. In what follows, we provide a brief 
overview of how the book elaborates upon these issues and offer a short presentation of our 
empirical material. 
 
5. Plan of the book 
Incrementalism is a mode of policy change that is well-known and studied in the comparative politics 
and comparative public policy literature. In the IPE literature on the politics of financial regulation, 
however, incrementalism is known but under-researched. The book aims at filling this gap by testing 
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and extending the application of insights primarily developed for explaining processes of change at 
the domestic level. Although the study of IPE will certainly be enriched by the analytical toolkit 
developed in other academic subfields, it will, we submit, be a two-way process. That is to say, by 
identifying the specific conditions that make financial regulation incremental, our research project is 
also able to speak to the broad community of scholars interested in patterns of policy change, 
providing detailed cases that can open up opportunities for further cross-issue comparative 
research. The remainder of this chapter provides a preview of the contributions and outlines how 
the different cases shed light on why incremental change has prevailed in the reform process 
following the global financial crisis. The volume is organised in two parts: the first focuses more on 
the evolution and reform of the regulatory framework post-crisis while the second is explicit in its 
emphasis on the actors at the centre of these processes. 
The first empirical case is provided by Andrew Baker, who focuses on the development of 
macroprudential ideas and how this significant ideational change has the potential to bring about 
more radical policy reform over time. Drawing on policy material and personal interviews pre- and 
post-crisis, Baker provides an analysis that highlights the dynamics of change across the 
transnational and domestic levels and explains how ideational coalitions can work to develop ideas 
into policy, building institutional support and know-how.  
The attention then turns to the specifics of the reformed and reforming regulatory landscape. Lucia 
Quaglia surveys the state of play in financial services governance in the European Union and 
examines how regulation and legislation enacted following the crisis measure up to intentions and 
the pre-crisis status quo. In her analysis, Quaglia finds institutional innovation and policy impetus but 
also enduring resistance both by states and private financial actors. As such, across governance 
levels, she observes that a significant number of veto players have placed constraints on more 
comprehensive reform. At the same time, she reminds us that such incrementalism should not be 
seen as maintenance of the status quo per se, as European financial governance has a history of 
proceeding in small steps.  
Moving on to the specifics of regulatory reform, Martin Carstensen offers an analysis of the nascent 
regime for bank resolution. By focusing on an area of regulatory concern that was expressly 
highlighted by the crisis, Carstensen follows the regulatory debate and traces the genealogy of 
reform ideas and the ideational struggles over how the principle of resolution regimes is to be 
translated into regulatory mechanics. Carstensen finds that although resolution as a principle is not 
fundamentally threatening pre-crisis global finance, resulting policy implementation can alter how 
financial crises are funded. As such, Carstensen offers a case where thinking through regulatory 
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dynamics in a manner that seemingly represents little or only incremental change to the operation 
of finance can lead to significant changes for the governance of finance in the long-run. 
The section closes with a contribution by Thomas Rixen who examines regulatory reform in relation 
to offshore financial centres and shadow banking. Rixen focuses on two interlinked cases which 
attracted a great deal of political attention in the aftermath of the crisis, though assessments as to 
their significance as factors in the crisis remained mixed. Overviewing reforms in these areas, and 
contrasting these reforms to original intentions, Rixen finds that change can be characterised as 
mostly symbolic. In explaining this outcome, Rixen points to enduring competitiveness interests of 
key states and in particular, their conception of jurisdictional competition. Aside from stressing the 
importance of the interstate dimension in explaining modest change, Rixen also provides a case 
where reform fails to keep pace with official pronouncements when those are actually detached 
from the issues perceived to be at the core of the reform process. 
The volume proceeds with three chapters more explicitly focused on the actors at the centre of the 
reform. Firstly, Stefano Pagliari and Kevin Young examine how financial institutions, seeing their 
privileged position in the regulatory framework threatened, have adapted their strategies and 
formed new advocacy coalitions, thus acting as veto players to reform. By tying their interests and 
preferences to the needs of the non-financial private sector, financial institutions have thus blocked 
more radical change. Empirically, Pagliari and Young survey the US regulatory and legislative debates 
regarding derivatives and, by analysing responses by financial and corporate financial actors, show 
that adaptability and mobilisation can slow the pace and weaken the content of reform, accounting 
for incrementalism even in the face of public scrutiny and implementation capacity. 
The next chapter by Sebastian Botzem shifts attention to the role of experts after the financial crisis, 
specifically analysing the enduring authority of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 
Botzem provides an overview of the key controversies and changes in global accountancy and shows 
that the IASB chose to undertake institutional reform and modestly change its governance structure 
and rule-setting procedures, while exhibiting flexible crisis management in adjusting the content of 
rules (fair value accounting) in non-normal times. Botzem shows that veto players can follow 
particular tactics to block extensive change. By acting strategically during the crisis and through the 
presentation of pre-crisis institutional reform decisions as post-crisis governance overhaul, the IASB 
managed the pace and content of change and avoided a possible crisis of expertise credibility, 
maintaining control of the ideational agenda.  
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The final case moves the focus to the domestic level and housing finance. Examining the US and 
Danish systems pre-and post-crisis, Iver Kjar explains how actors can use their institutional position 
at the domestic level to oppose change. Specifically, Kjar takes an everyday IPE approach to highlight 
the importance of societal interests in lending legitimacy to existing and reforming governance 
frameworks. Kjar explains that the political power of homeowners as an electoral force has acted as 
a veto to radical change in housing finance in two seemingly very different financial systems and 
that, despite the central role of housing at the onset of the financial crisis. When backed by such 
societal concerns, the financial institutions which have long benefited from these arrangements are 
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